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Application-level isolation and recovery with solitude
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European Conference on Computer Systems archive
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2008 table of contents
Glasgow, Scotland UK
SESSION: File systems table of contents
Pages 95-107  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-60558-013-5
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Authors
Shvetank Jain  University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
Fareha Shafique  University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
Vladan Djeric  University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
Ashvin Goel  University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
Sponsors
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

When computer systems are compromised by an attack, it is difficult to determine the precise extent of the damage caused by the attack because the state changes made by an attacker and those made by regular users can be closely intertwined. This problem occurs due to implicit sharing in operating systems, and it can be especially severe for persistent state. In particular, the file system provides a single namespace that when compromised can have cascading effects on the entire system, making intrusion analysis and recovery a time-consuming and error-prone process.

In this paper, we present Solitude, an application-level isolation and recovery system that is designed to both limit the effects of attacks and simplify the post-intrusion recovery process. Solitude uses a copy-on-write filesystem to provide a transparent, restricted privilege isolation environment for running untrusted applications, and it uses an explicit file sharing mechanism across the isolation environments that limits attack propagation without compromising functionality. Solitude provides two modes of recovery. If a sandboxed application proves to be untrustworthy, a course-grained recovery method allows easily removing the footprint of the software. However, if a user mistakenly moves malicious files to the trusted environment via explicit file sharing, then Solitude uses data dependency tracking to allow fine-grained recovery.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Shvetank Jain: colleagues
Fareha Shafique: colleagues
Vladan Djeric: colleagues
Ashvin Goel: colleagues