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Computing core payments in combinatorial auctions
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Volume 7 ,  Issue 1  (December 2007) table of contents
Pages 22-24  
Year of Publication: 2007
Authors
Robert W. Day  University of Connecticut
S. Raghavan  University of Maryland
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
AUSUBEL, L. AND CRAMTON, P. 1999. The optimality of being efficient. Working paper, University of Maryland. Jun.
 
2
AUSUBEL, L. AND MILGROM, P. 2002. Ascending auctions with package bidding. Frontiers of Theoretical Economics 1, 1, 1-42.
 
3
BERNHEIM, B. AND WHINSTON, M. 1986. Menu auctions, resource allocation and economic influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 1-31.
 
4
DAY, R. AND RAGHAVAN, S. 2007. Fair payments for efficient allocations in public sector combinatorial auctions. Management Science 53, 9, 1389-1406.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Robert W. Day: colleagues
S. Raghavan: colleagues