ACM Portal
  Subscribe (Full Service)    Register (Limited Service, Free)    Login
  Search:   The ACM Digital Library   The Guide
  
ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Duality in combinatorial auctions
Full text PdfPdf (99 KB)
Source ACM SIGecom Exchanges archive
Volume 7 ,  Issue 1  (December 2007) table of contents
Pages 19-21  
Year of Publication: 2007
Authors
Sushil Bikhchandani  Anderson School of Management, UCLA
Joseph M. Ostroy  Department of Economics, UCLA
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 1,   Downloads (12 Months): 12,   Citation Count: 0
Additional Information:

references   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1345037.1345041
What is a DOI?

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
AUSUBEL, L. M. 2004. An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects. American Economic Review 94, 1452-1475.
 
2
AUSUBEL, L. M. AND MILGROM, P. 2002. Ascending auctions with package bidding. Frontiers of Theoretical Economics 1, 1-42.
 
3
BIKHCHANDANI, S. AND OSTROY, J. M. 2002. The package assignment model. Journal of Economic Theory 107, 377-406.
 
4
BIKHCHANDANI, S. AND OSTROY, J. M. 2006. Ascending price vickrey auctions. Games and Economic Behavior 55, 215-241.
 
5
DE VRIES, S., SCHUMMER, J., AND VOHRA, R. 2007. On ascending vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects. Journal of Economic Theory 132, 95-118.
 
6
DEMANGE, G., GALE, D., AND SOTOMAYOR, M. 1986. Multi-item auctions. Journal of Political Economy 94, 863-872.
 
7
KELSO, A. AND CRAWFORD, V. 1982. Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes. Econometrica 50, 1483-1504.
 
8
MISHRA, D. AND PARKES, D. C. 2007. Ascending price vickrey auctions for general valuations. Journal of Economic Theory 132, 335-366.
 
9
MUROTA, K. 2003. Discrete Convex Analysis. SIAM, Philadelphia, PA.
 
10
David C. Parkes , Lyle H. Ungar, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice, Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, p.74-81, July 30-August 03, 2000

INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  F. Theory of Computation
  F.2 ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHMS AND PROBLEM COMPLEXITY
      F.2.2 Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems
          Subjects: Sequencing and scheduling

Additional Classification:
  G. Mathematics of Computing
  G.1 NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
      G.1.6 Optimization
  G.2 DISCRETE MATHEMATICS
      G.2.1 Combinatorics
          Subjects: Combinatorial algorithms
      G.2.3 Applications

  H. Information Systems
  H.3 INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL
      H.3.5 On-line Information Services
          Subjects: Commercial services
  H.4 INFORMATION SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS
      H.4.2 Types of Systems
          Subjects: Decision support (e.g., MIS)


General Terms:
Algorithms, Design, Theory


Keywords:
buyers are substitutes, discrete concavity, linear programming, primal-dual algorithm, vickrey auctions

Collaborative Colleagues:
Sushil Bikhchandani: colleagues
Joseph M. Ostroy: colleagues

The ACM Portal is published by the Association for Computing Machinery. Copyright © 2009 ACM, Inc.
Terms of Usage   Privacy Policy   Code of Ethics   Contact Us

Useful downloads: Adobe Acrobat    QuickTime    Windows Media Player    Real Player