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ABSTRACT
Malware detectors require a specification of maliciousbehavior. Typically, these specifications are manually constructedby investigating known malware. We present an automatic technique to overcome this laborious manual process. Our technique derives such a specification by comparing the execution behavior of a known malware against the execution behaviors of a set of benign programs. In other words, we mine the malicious behavior present in a known malware that is not present in a set of benign programs. The output of our algorithm can be used by malware detectors to detect malware variants. Since our algorithm provides a succinct description of malicious behavior present in a malware, it can also be used by security analysts for understanding the malware. We have implemented a prototype based on our algorithm and tested it on several malware programs. Experimental results obtained from our prototype indicate that our algorithm is effective in extracting malicious behaviors that can be used to detect malware variants
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