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Graphical models for online solutions to interactive POMDPs
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International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems table of contents
Honolulu, Hawaii
SESSION: Multiagent planning: full papers table of contents
Article No. 217  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-81-904262-7-5
Authors
Prashant Doshi  University of Georgia, Athens, GA
Yifeng Zeng  Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark
Qiongyu Chen  National Univ. of Singapore, Singapore
Sponsor
: IFAAMAS
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We develop a new graphical representation for interactive partially observable Markov decision processes (I-POMDPs) that is significantly more transparent and semantically clear than the previous representation. These graphical models called interactive dynamic influence diagrams (I-DIDs) seek to explicitly model the structure that is often present in real-world problems by decomposing the situation into chance and decision variables, and the dependencies between the variables. I-DIDs generalize DIDs, which may be viewed as graphical representations of POMDPs, to multiagent settings in the same way that I-POMDPs generalize POMDPs. I-DIDs may be used to compute the policy of an agent online as the agent acts and observes in a setting that is populated by other interacting agents. Using several examples, we show how I-DIDs may be applied and demonstrate their usefulness.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Prashant Doshi: colleagues
Yifeng Zeng: colleagues
Qiongyu Chen: colleagues