A framework for reasoning about rational agents

ABSTRACT

We propose an extension of alternating-time temporal logic, that can be used for reasoning about the behavior and abilities of agents under various rationality assumptions.

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  I. Computing Methodologies
  I.2 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
        I.2.11 Distributed Artificial Intelligence
            Subjects: Multiagent systems

Additional Classification:
  I. Computing Methodologies
  I.2 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
      I.2.4 Knowledge Representation Formalisms and Methods
          Subjects: Modal logic

General Terms:
Theory

Keywords:
game theory, multiagent systems, rationality, temporal logic