Unawareness and strategic announcements in games with uncertainty

ABSTRACT

I study games with uncertainty where players have different awareness regarding a chance player's moves (contingencies). An announcer, who is fully aware of the contingencies, can announce some of them to an unaware decision maker (DM) before the DM takes an action. I introduce an equilibrium concept and a refinement to study the way the DM generates her belief on her extended awareness.

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