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Delayed password disclosure
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ACM SIGACT News archive
Volume 38 ,  Issue 3  (September 2007) table of contents
COLUMN: Distributed computing table of contents
Pages: 56 - 75  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISSN:0163-5700
Authors
Markus Jakobsson  Indiana University at Bloomington
Steven Myers  Indiana University at Bloomington
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We present a new authentication protocol called Delayed Password Disclosure. Based on the traditional username and password paradigm, the protocol's goal is aimed at reducing the effectiveness of phishing/spoofing attacks that are becoming increasingly problematic for Internet users. This is done by providing the user with dynamic feedback while password entry occurs. While this is a process that would normally be frowned upon by the cryptographic community, we argue that it may result in more effective security than that offered by currently proposed "cryptographically acceptable" alternatives. While the protocol cannot prevent partial disclosure of one's password to the phisher, it does provide a user with the tools necessary to recognize an ongoing phishing attack, and prevent the disclosure of his/her entire password, providing graceful security degradation.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Vivek Anandpara, Andrew Dingman, Markus Jakobsson, Debin Liu, and Heather Roinestad. Phishing IQ tests measure fear, not ability. In Usable Security (USEC), 2007. http://www.informatics.indiana.edu/markus/papers/phish6.pdf.
 
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M. Bellare, A. Boldyreva, and A. Palacio. An uninstantiable random-oracle-model scheme for a hybrid-encryption problem. In C. Canchin and J. Camenisch, editors, Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT'04, pages 171--188. Springer, 2004.
 
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Mihir Bellare, David Pointcheval, and Phillip Rogaway. Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks. EUROCRYPT-Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1807:139--155, 2000.
 
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Daniel R. L. Brown and Robert P. Gallant. The static Diffie-Hellman problem. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/306, 2004. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
 
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Fred Cate. Liability for phishing (chapter 18), In Phishing and Countermeasures: Understanding the Increasing Problem of Electronic Identity Theft. Editors Markus Jakobsson and Steven Myers, 2006.
 
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Neil Chou, Robert Ledesma, Yuka Teraguchi, Dan Boneh, and John C. Mitchell. Client-side defense against web-based identity theft, April 2004.
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Aaron Emigh. Online identity theft: Technology, chokepoints and countermeasures. In DHS Report, 2005.
 
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Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. Authentication in an internet banking environment, October 2005. http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf.
 
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Amir Herzberg and Ahmad Gbara. Trustbar: Protecting (even naive). web users from spoofing and phishing attacks, 2004.
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Collin Jackson, Dan Simon, Desney Tan, and Adam Barth. An evaluation of extended validation and picture-in-picture phishing attacks, In Usable Security 2007. http://www.usablesecurity.org/papers/jackson.pdf.
 
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Markus Jakobsson, Tom N. Jagatic, and Sid Stamm. Phishing for clues: Inferring context using cascading style sheets and browser history, 2005. http://www.browser-recon.info.
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Markus Jakobsson and Alex Tsow. Making takedown difficult (chapter 11), In Phishing and Counter-measures: Understanding the Increasing Problem of Electronic Identity Theft. Editors Markus Jakobsson and Steven Myers, 2006.
 
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Markus Jakobsson, Alex Tsow, Ankur Shah, Eli Blevis, and Yung-Kyung Lim. What instills trust? a qualitative study of phishing, 2007. Usable Security '07, http://www.informatics.indiana.edu/markus/papers/trust_USEC.pdf.
 
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Netcraft News. More than 450 phishing attacks used SSL in 2005. http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2005/12/28/more_than_450_phishing_attacks_used_ssl_in_2005.html.
 
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Bryan Parno, Cynthia Kuo, and Adrian Perrig. Phoolproof phishing prevention. In Giovanni Di Crescenzo and Avi Rubin, editors, Financial Cryptography, volume 4107 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 1--19. Springer, 2006.
 
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Sukamol Srikwan and Markus Jakobsson. Using cartoons to teach internet security. DIMACS Technical Report 2007--11, July, 2007. http://www.informatics.indiana.edu/markus/documents/security-education.pdf.
 
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Sid Stamm, Zulfikar Ramzan, and Markus Jakobsson. Drive-by pharming, 2006. Indiana University Technical Report TR641, http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/Driveby_Pharming.pdf.
 
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Webwhacker 5.0. http://www.bluesquirrel.com/products/webwhacker/, accessed July 26, 2007.
 
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Yahoo! http://security.yahoo.com/article.html?aid=2006102507, accessed July 26, 2007.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Markus Jakobsson: colleagues
Steven Myers: colleagues