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Provable data possession at untrusted stores
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Data disclosure table of contents
Pages: 598 - 609  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-703-2
Authors
Giuseppe Ateniese  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD
Randal Burns  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD
Reza Curtmola  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD
Joseph Herring  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD
Lea Kissner  Google, Inc., Mountain View, CA
Zachary Peterson  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD
Dawn Song  University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA & Carnegie Melon University, Pittsburgh, PA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We introduce a model for provable data possession (PDP) that allows a client that has stored data at an untrusted server to verify that the server possesses the original data without retrieving it. The model generates probabilistic proofs of possession by sampling random sets of blocks from the server, which drastically reduces I/O costs. The client maintains a constant amount of metadata to verify the proof. The challenge/response protocol transmits a small, constant amount of data, which minimizes network communication. Thus, the PDP model for remote data checking supports large data sets in widely-distributed storage system.

We present two provably-secure PDP schemes that are more efficient than previous solutions, even when compared with schemes that achieve weaker guarantees. In particular, the overhead at the server is low (or even constant), as opposed to linear in the size of the data. Experiments using our implementation verify the practicality of PDP and reveal that the performance of PDP is bounded by disk I/O and not by cryptographic computation.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Giuseppe Ateniese: colleagues
Randal Burns: colleagues
Reza Curtmola: colleagues
Joseph Herring: colleagues
Lea Kissner: colleagues
Zachary Peterson: colleagues
Dawn Song: colleagues