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Harvesting verifiable challenges from oblivious online sources
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Protocols and spam filters table of contents
Pages: 330 - 341  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-703-2
Authors
J. Alex Halderman  Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
Brent Waters  SRI International, Palo Alto, CA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Several important security protocols require parties to perform computations based on random challenges. Traditionally, proving that the challenges were randomly chosen has required interactive communication among the parties or the existence of a trusted server. We offer an alternative solution where challenges are harvested from oblivious servers on the Internet. This paper describes a framework for deriving "harvested challenges" by mixing data from various pre-existing online sources. While individual sources may become predictable or fall under adversarial control, we provide a policy language that allows application developers to specify combinations of sources that meet their security needs. Participants can then convince each other that their challenges were formed freshly and in accordance with the policy. We present Combine, an open source implementation of our framework, and show how it can be applied to a variety of applications, including remote storage auditing and non-interactive client puzzles.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
J. Alex Halderman: colleagues
Brent Waters: colleagues