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An information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Side and covert channels detection table of contents
Pages: 286 - 296  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-703-2
Authors
Boris Köpf  ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
David Basin  ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We present a model of adaptive side-channel attacks which we combine with information-theoretic metrics to quantify the information revealed to an attacker. This allows us to express an attacker's remaining uncertainty about a secret as a function of the number of side-channel measurements made. We present algorithms and approximation techniques for computing this measure. We also give examples of how they can be used to analyze the resistance of hardware implementations of cryptographic functions to both timing and power attacks.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Boris Köpf: colleagues
David Basin: colleagues