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Shunting: a hardware/software architecture for flexible, high-performance network intrusion prevention
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Traffic analysis and location privacy table of contents
Pages: 139 - 149  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-703-2
Authors
Jose M. Gonzalez  International Computer Science Institute, Berkeley, CA
Vern Paxson  International Computer Science Institute, Berkeley, CA
Nicholas Weaver  International Computer Science Institute, Berkeley, CA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Stateful, in-depth, inline traffic analysis for intrusion detection and prevention is growing increasingly more difficult as the data rates of modern networks rise. Yet it remains the case that in many environments, much of the traffic comprising a high-volume stream can, after some initial analysis, be qualified as of "likely uninteresting." We present a combined hardware/software architecture, Shunting, that provides a lightweight mechanism for an intrusion prevention system (IPS) to take advantage of the "heavy-tailed" nature of network traffic to offload work from software to hardware.

The primary innovation of Shunting is the introduction of a simple in-line hardware element that caches rules for IP addresses and connection 5-tuples, as well as fixed rules for IP/TCP flags. The caches, using a highest-priority match, yield a per-packet decision: forward the packet; drop it; or divert it through the IPS. By manipulating cache entries, the IPS can specify what traffic it no longer wishes to examine, including directly blocking malicious sources or cutting through portions of a single flow once the it has had an opportunity to "vet" them, all on a fine-grained basis.

We have implemented a prototype Shunt hardware design using the NetFPGA 2 platform, capable of Gigabit Ethernet operation. In addition, we have adapted the Bro intrusion detection system to utilize the Shunt framework to offload less-interesting traffic. We evaluate the effectiveness of the resulting system using traces from three sites, finding that the IDS can use this mechanism to offload 55%-90% of the traffic, as well as gaining intrusion prevention functionality.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Jose M. Gonzalez: colleagues
Vern Paxson: colleagues
Nicholas Weaver: colleagues