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Dynamic pharming attacks and locked same-origin policies for web browsers
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Authentication and passwords table of contents
Pages: 58 - 71  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-703-2
Authors
Chris Karlof  UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA
Umesh Shankar  Google: Inc., New York, NY
J. D. Tygar  UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA
David Wagner  UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We describe a new attack against web authentication, which we call dynamic pharming. Dynamic pharming works by hijacking DNS and sending the victim's browser malicious Javascript, which then exploits DNS rebinding vulnerabilities and the name-based same-origin policy to hijack a legitimate session after authentication has taken place. As a result, the attack works regardless of the authentication scheme used. Dynamic pharming enables the adversary to eavesdrop on sensitive content, forge transactions, sniff secondary passwords, etc. To counter dynamic pharming attacks, we propose two locked same-origin policies for web browsers. In contrast to the legacy same-origin policy, which regulates cross-object access control in browsers using domain names, the locked same-origin policies enforce access using servers' X.509 certificates and public keys. We show how our policies help two existing web authentication mechanisms, client-side SSL and SSL-only cookies, resist both pharming and stronger active attacks. Also, we present a deployability analysis of our policies based on a study of 14651 SSL domains. Our results suggest one of our policies can be deployed today and interoperate seamlessly with the vast majority of legacy web servers. For our other policy, we present a simple incrementally deployable opt-in mechanism for legacy servers using policy files, and show how web sites can use policy files to support self-signed and untrusted certificates, shared subdomain objects, and key updates.


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CITED BY  8

Collaborative Colleagues:
Chris Karlof: colleagues
Umesh Shankar: colleagues
J. D. Tygar: colleagues
David Wagner: colleagues