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ABSTRACT
We propose to design and implement a voting architecture that efficiently tolerates byzantine failure, supports inexact matching of inputs, and preserves privacy. Its functionality includes integrating replies from different correct servers whose data may differ slightly from one another due to environmental factors, filtering out replies from faulty servers to protect any intentional or unintentional leakage of confidential data, and dynamically adapting to different applications by incorporating new rules. We also explore how to distribute replies and cryptographic key so that a compromised voter would reveal only a partial key or partial replies. REFERENCES
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