ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Flexible intrusion tolerant voting architecture
Full text PdfPdf (120 KB)
Source
Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Scalable trusted computing table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Applications table of contents
Pages: 71 - 74  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-888-6
Authors
Soontaree Tanaraksiritavorn  University of Colorado
Shivakant Mishra  University of Colorado
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 3,   Downloads (12 Months): 37,   Citation Count: 0
Additional Information:

abstract   references   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1314354.1314372
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

We propose to design and implement a voting architecture that efficiently tolerates byzantine failure, supports inexact matching of inputs, and preserves privacy. Its functionality includes integrating replies from different correct servers whose data may differ slightly from one another due to environmental factors, filtering out replies from faulty servers to protect any intentional or unintentional leakage of confidential data, and dynamically adapting to different applications by incorporating new rules. We also explore how to distribute replies and cryptographic key so that a compromised voter would reveal only a partial key or partial replies.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
2
 
3
Y. G. Desmedt. Threshold cryptography. In European Trans. on Telecommunications, 1994.
 
4
Y. Deswarte, L. Blain, and J.-C. Fabre. Intrusion tolerance in distributed computing systems. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 110--121, 1991.
 
5
B. Hardekopf, K. Kwiat, and S. Upadhyaya. Secure and fault-tolerant voting in distributed systems. In IEEE Proceedings of Aerospace Conference 2001, volume 3, pages 1117--1126, 2001.
 
6
 
7
B. Parhami. Voting algorithms. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 43(4):617--629, 1994.
8
9

Collaborative Colleagues:
Soontaree Tanaraksiritavorn: colleagues
Shivakant Mishra: colleagues