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Linux kernel integrity measurement using contextual inspection
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Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Scalable trusted computing table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Trusted platform, channel, and storage table of contents
Pages: 21 - 29  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-888-6
Authors
Peter A. Loscocco  National Security Agency
Perry W. Wilson  The Johns Hopkins University
J. Aaron Pendergrass  The Johns Hopkins University
C. Durward McDonell  The Johns Hopkins University
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

This paper introduces the Linux Kernel Integrity Monitor (LKIM) as an improvement over conventional methods of software integrity measurement. LKIM employs contextual inspection as a means to more completely characterize the operational integrity of a running kernel. In addition to cryptographically hashing static code and data in the kernel, dynamic data structures are examined to provide improved integrity measurement. The base approach examines structures that control the execution flow of the kernel through the use of function pointers as well as other data that affect the operation of the kernel. Such structures provide an efficient means of extending the kernel operations, but they are also a means of inserting malicious code without modifying the static parts. The LKIM implementation is discussed and initial performance data is presented to show that contextual inspection is practical


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Peter A. Loscocco: colleagues
Perry W. Wilson: colleagues
J. Aaron Pendergrass: colleagues
C. Durward McDonell: colleagues