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ABSTRACT
Many algorithms or protocols, in particular cryptographic protocols such as authentication protocols, use synchronized clocks and depend on them for correctness. This note describes a scenario where a clock synchronization failure renders a protocol vulnerable to an attack even after the faulty clock has been resynchronized. The attack exploits a postdated message by first suppressing it and replaying it later.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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[9] S.W. Luan and V.D Gligor, "On Replay Detection in Distributed Systems", in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, Paris, May, 1990, pp. 188-195.
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[13] "Flawed computer chip sold for years", in RISKS-FORUM Digest, edited by P.G. Neumann, Vol. 10, No. 54, October 18, 1990.
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