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A security risk of depending on synchronized clocks
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Source ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review archive
Volume 26 ,  Issue 1  (January 1992) table of contents
Pages: 49 - 53  
Year of Publication: 1992
ISSN:0163-5980
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ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Many algorithms or protocols, in particular cryptographic protocols such as authentication protocols, use synchronized clocks and depend on them for correctness. This note describes a scenario where a clock synchronization failure renders a protocol vulnerable to an attack even after the faulty clock has been resynchronized. The attack exploits a postdated message by first suppressing it and replaying it later.


REFERENCES

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[9] S.W. Luan and V.D Gligor, "On Replay Detection in Distributed Systems", in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, Paris, May, 1990, pp. 188-195.
 
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[13] "Flawed computer chip sold for years", in RISKS-FORUM Digest, edited by P.G. Neumann, Vol. 10, No. 54, October 18, 1990.
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CITED BY  18