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SLEDE: lightweight verification of sensor network security protocol implementations
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Source Foundations of Software Engineering archive
The 6th Joint Meeting on European software engineering conference and the ACM SIGSOFT symposium on the foundations of software engineering: companion papers table of contents
Dubrovnik, Croatia
SESSION: Doctoral symposium table of contents
Pages: 591 - 594  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-812-1
Author
Youssef Hanna  Iowa State University, Ames, IA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSOFT: ACM Special Interest Group on Software Engineering
CEPIS : The Council of European Professional Informatics Societies
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Finding flaws in security protocol implementations is hard. Finding flaws in the implementations of sensor network security protocols is even harder because they are designed to protect against more system failures compared to traditional protocols. Formal verification techniques such as model checking, theorem proving, etc, have been very successful in the past in detecting faults in security protocol specifications; however, they generally require a model. Developing these models is a non-trivial task for an average developer. This task is further complicated by the impedance mismatch between the implementation language and the modeling language. For example, while the dominant implementation language for sensor network applications (nesC) uses an event-based paradigm, the modeling language (Promela) uses message-driven paradigm. The key goal of this research is to ease the task of verifying sensor network security protocol implementations for the sensor network community by defining an approach for automatically extracting a model from the nesC implementations of a security protocol. We contribute the design and implementation of a verification framework that we call Slede which emulates our approach to extract a PROMELA model from nesC security protocol implementations. By significantly decreasing the cost of verification, we believe our approach will improve the overall quality of the nesC security protocol implementations.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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