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Attested append-only memory: making adversaries stick to their word
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ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles archive
Proceedings of twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating systems principles table of contents
Stevenson, Washington, USA
SESSION: Distributed systems table of contents
Pages: 189 - 204  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-591-5
Also published in ...
Authors
Byung-Gon Chun  UC Berkeley, Berkeley
Petros Maniatis  Intel Research Berkeley, Berkeley
Scott Shenker  UC Berkeley, Berkeley
John Kubiatowicz  UC Berkeley, Berkeley
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 20,   Downloads (12 Months): 131,   Citation Count: 9
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APPENDICES and SUPPLEMENTS
Zipp189-slides.zip (23.25 MB),
Supplemental material for Attested append-only memory: making adversaries stick to their word


ABSTRACT

Researchers have made great strides in improving the fault tolerance of both centralized and replicated systems against arbitrary (Byzantine) faults. However, there are hard limits to how much can be done with entirely untrusted components; for example, replicated state machines cannot tolerate more than a third of their replica population being Byzantine. In this paper, we investigate how minimal trusted abstractions can push through these hard limits in practical ways. We propose Attested Append-Only Memory (A2M), a trusted system facility that is small, easy to implement and easy to verify formally. A2M provides the programming abstraction of a trusted log, which leads to protocol designs immune to equivocation -- the ability of a faulty host to lie in different ways to different clients or servers -- which is a common source of Byzantine headaches. Using A2M, we improve upon the state of the art in Byzantine-fault tolerant replicated state machines, producing A2M-enabled protocols (variants of Castro and Liskov's PBFT) that remain correct (linearizable) and keep making progress (live) even when half the replicas are faulty, in contrast to the previous upper bound. We also present an A2M-enabled single-server shared storage protocol that guarantees linearizability despite server faults. We implement A2M and our protocols, evaluate them experimentally through micro- and macro-benchmarks, and argue that the improved fault tolerance is cost-effective for a broad range of uses, opening up new avenues for practical, more reliable services.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  9

Collaborative Colleagues:
Byung-Gon Chun: colleagues
Petros Maniatis: colleagues
Scott Shenker: colleagues
John Kubiatowicz: colleagues