ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Digital Library logoTake a look at the new version of this page: [ beta version ]. Tell us what you think.
A smart random code injection to mask power analysis based side channel attacks
Full text PdfPdf (328 KB)
Source
International Conference on Hardware Software Codesign archive
Proceedings of the 5th IEEE/ACM international conference on Hardware/software codesign and system synthesis table of contents
Salzburg, Austria
SESSION: Embedded systems table of contents
Pages: 51 - 56  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-824-4
Authors
Jude Angelo Ambrose  University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Roshan G. Ragel  University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Sri Parameswaran  University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Sponsors
SIGDA: ACM Special Interest Group on Design Automation
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGBED: ACM Special Interest Group on Embedded Systems
SIGMICRO: ACM Special Interest Group on Microarchitectural Research and Processing
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 9,   Downloads (12 Months): 64,   Citation Count: 1
Additional Information:

abstract   references   cited by   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1289816.1289832
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

One of the security issues in embedded system is the ability of an adversary to perform side channel attacks. Power analysis attacks are often very successful, where the power sequence dissipated by the system is observed and analyzed to predict secret keys. In this paper we show a processor architecture, which automatically detects the execution of the most common encryption algorithms, starts to scramble the power waveform by adding randomly placed instructions with random register accesses, and stops injecting instructions when it is safe to do so. Our technique prevents both Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). This approach has less overheads compared to previous solutions and avoids software instrumentation, allowing programmers with no special knowledge to use the system. Our processor model costs an additional area of 1.2%, and an average of 25% in runtime and 28.5% in energy overheads for industry standard cryptographic algorithms.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
Sourcebank. url: http://archive.devx.com/sourcebank.
 
2
The PEAS Team. ASIP Meister, 2002. Available at: http://www.edameister.org/asipmeister.
 
3
 
4
M. Barbosa and D. Page. On the automatic construction of indistinguishable operations. In Cryptography And Coding, pages 233--247. Springer-Verlag LNCS 3796, November 2005.
 
5
E. Brier, C. Clavier, and F. Olivier. Correlation power analysis with a leakagemodel. In CHES, pages 16--29, 2004.
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
9
 
10
J. Daemen and V. Rijmen. Resistance against implementation attacks: a comparative study of the AES proposals, 1999.
 
11
B. S. David, C. Lap-Wai, and M. C. William. Cryptographic architecture with random instruction masking to thwart differential power analysis. U.S. Patent 20050271202, 2005.
 
12
C. Gebotys. A Table Masking Countermeasure for Low-Energy Secure Embedded Systems. IEEE Trans. on VLSI, 14(7):740--753, 2006.
 
13
14
 
15
 
16
 
17
 
18
A. Janapsatya, A. Ignjatovic, and S. Parameswaran. Exploiting statistical information for implementation of instruction scratch memory in embedded system. IEEE Trans. on VLSI, 14(8):816--829, 2006.
 
19
S. Mangard. A Simple Power--Analysis (SPA) Attack on Implementations of the AES Key Expansion. In P. J. Lee and C. H. Lim, editors, icisc 2002, volume 2587 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 343--358. Springer, 2003.
 
20
 
21
 
22
 
23
24
 
25
 
26
E. Oswald, S. Mangard, C. Herbst, and S. Tillich. Practical Second-Order DPA Attacks for Masked Smart Card Implementations of Block Ciphers. In ct-rsa 2006, pages 192--207. Springer, 2006.
 
27
Paul Bourke. Cross Correlation: AutoCorrelation -- 2D Pattern Identification. url:http://astronomy.swin.edu.au/ pbourke/other/correlate/index.html, 1996.
 
28
J. J. Paul Kocher and B. Jun. Differential Power Analysis. 1998. First article on DPA.
 
29
 
30
 
31
 
32
33
 
34
J. Waddle and D. Wagner. Towards efficient second-order power analysis. In CHES, pages 1--15, 2004.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Jude Angelo Ambrose: colleagues
Roshan G. Ragel: colleagues
Sri Parameswaran: colleagues