ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
802.11 user fingerprinting
Full text PdfPdf (498 KB)
Source
International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking archive
Proceedings of the 13th annual ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking table of contents
Montréal, Québec, Canada
SESSION: Security and privacy table of contents
Pages: 99 - 110  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-681-3
Authors
Jeffrey Pang  Carnegie Mellon University
Ben Greenstein  Intel Research Seattle
Ramakrishna Gummadi  University of Southern California
Srinivasan Seshan  Carnegie Mellon University
David Wetherall  University of Washington
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGMOBILE: ACM Special Interest Group on Mobility of Systems, Users, Data and Computing
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 34,   Downloads (12 Months): 257,   Citation Count: 9
Additional Information:

abstract   references   cited by   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1287853.1287866
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

The ubiquity of 802.11 devices and networks enables anyone to track our every move with alarming ease. Each 802.11 device transmits a globally unique and persistent MAC address and thus is trivially identifiable. In response, recent research has proposed replacing such identifiers with pseudonyms (i.e., temporary, unlinkable names). In this paper, we demonstrate that pseudonyms are insufficient to prevent tracking of 802.11 devices because implicit identifiers, or identifying characteristics of 802.11 traffic, can identify many users with high accuracy. For example, even without unique names and addresses, we estimate that an adversary can identify 64% of users with 90% accuracy when they spend a day at a busy hot spot. We present an automated procedure based on four previously unrecognized implicit identifiers that can identify users in three real 802.11 traces even when pseudonyms and encryption are employed. We find that the majority of users can be identified using our techniques, but our ability to identify users is not uniform; some users are not easily identifiable. Nonetheless, we show that even a single implicit identifier is sufficient to distinguish many users. Therefore, we argue that design considerations beyond eliminating explicit identifiers (i.e., unique names and addresses), must be addressed in order to prevent user tracking in wireless networks.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
Big boss is watching. CNET News.com, Sept. 2004. http://news.com. com/Big+boss+is+watching/2100-1036_3-5379953.html.
 
2
Wireless location tracking draws privacy questions. CNET News.com, May 2006. http://news.com.com/Wireless+location+tracking+draws+privacy+questions/2100-1028_3-6072992.html.
 
3
Wi-fi hacking, with a handheld PDA. ZDNet, Feb. 2007. http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=19.
 
4
5
 
6
BAHL, P., AND PADMANABHAN, V. N. RADAR: An in-building RF-based user location and tracking system. In INFOCOM (2000).
 
7
 
8
BISSIAS, G., LIBERATORE, M., JENSEN, D., AND LEVINE, B. N. Privacy vulnerabilities in encrypted http streams. In Proc. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Workshop (2005).
 
9
BRESLAU, L., CAO, P., FAN, L., PHILLIPS, G., AND SHENKER, S. Web caching and Zipf-like distributions: Evidence and implications. In INFOCOM (1999).
10
 
11
 
12
FYODOR. Nmap network security scanner. http://insecure.org/nmap/.
 
13
 
14
 
15
HAVERINEN, H., AND SALOWEY, J. Extensible authentication protocol method for global system for mobile communications (GSM) subscriber identity modules (EAP-SIM), 2006. IETF RFC 4186. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4186.txt.
 
16
IEEE 802.11i-2004 amendment to IEEE std 802.11, 2004.
 
17
IETF geographic location/privacy working group charter. http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/geopriv-charter.html.
18
19
20
 
21
 
22
Location privacy protection act of 2001. U.S. Senate bill.
 
23
MICROSOFT. Wireless Client Update for Windows XP with service pack 2, http://support.microsoft.com/kb/917021.
24
25
 
26
MORRIS, R. http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/~rtm/.
 
27
MUNIWIRELESS. http://www.muniwireless.com/.
 
28
p0f. http://freshmeat.net/projects/p0f/.
 
29
PADMANABHAN, B., AND YANG, Y. Clickprints on the web: Are there signatures in web browsing data? http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/papers/1323.pdf, 2006.
 
30
R DEVELOPMENT CORE TEAM. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing, 2006. http://www.R-project.org.
 
31
RODRIG, M., REIS, C., MAHAJAN, R., WETHERALL, D., ZAHORJAN, J., AND LAZOWSKA, E. CRAWDAD data set uw/sigcomm2004 (v. 2006-10-17). http://crawdad.cs.dartmouth.edu/meta.php?name=uw/sigcomm2004, Oct. 2006.
 
32
Roofnet. http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/roofnet/.
 
33
 
34
35
 
36
 
37
tcpdump. http://www.tcpdump.org/.
 
38
 
39
WIGLE. http://www.wigle.net/.
 
40
Wireless privacy protection act of 2005. U.S. House bill.
 
41
WONG, F.-L., AND STAJANO, F. Location privacy in bluetooth. In ESAS (2005).
 
42
 
43

CITED BY  9

Collaborative Colleagues:
Jeffrey Pang: colleagues
Ben Greenstein: colleagues
Ramakrishna Gummadi: colleagues
Srinivasan Seshan: colleagues
David Wetherall: colleagues