ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
ODSBR: An on-demand secure Byzantine resilient routing protocol for wireless ad hoc networks
Full text PdfPdf (2.02 MB)
Source
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) archive
Volume 10 ,  Issue 4  (January 2008) table of contents
Article No. 6  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISSN:1094-9224
Authors
Baruch Awerbuch  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland
Reza Curtmola  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland
David Holmer  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland
Cristina Nita-Rotaru  Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana
Herbert Rubens  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 28,   Downloads (12 Months): 243,   Citation Count: 2
Additional Information:

abstract   references   cited by   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1284680.1341892
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

Ah hoc networks offer increased coverage by using multihop communication. This architecture makes services more vulnerable to internal attacks coming from compromised nodes that behave arbitrarily to disrupt the network, also referred to as Byzantine attacks. In this work, we examine the impact of several Byzantine attacks performed by individual or colluding attackers. We propose ODSBR, the first on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc wireless networks that provides resilience to Byzantine attacks caused by individual or colluding nodes. The protocol uses an adaptive probing technique that detects a malicious link after log n faults have occurred, where n is the length of the path. Problematic links are avoided by using a route discovery mechanism that relies on a new metric that captures adversarial behavior. Our protocol never partitions the network and bounds the amount of damage caused by attackers. We demonstrate through simulations ODSBR's effectiveness in mitigating Byzantine attacks. Our analysis of the impact of these attacks versus the adversary's effort gives insights into their relative strengths, their interaction, and their importance when designing multihop wireless routing protocols.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
The network simulator - ns2. http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/.
 
2
1999a. IEEE Std 802.11a-1999. http://standards.ieee.org/.
 
3
1999b. IEEE Std 802.11b-1999. http://standards.ieee.org/.
 
4
AES. 2001. Advanced Encryption Standard. Number FIPS 197. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/.
 
5
 
6
Bradley, K. A., Cheung, S., Puketza, N., Mukherjee, B., and Olsson, R. A. 1998. Detecting disruptive routers: A distributed network monitoring approach. In Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
 
7
8
 
9
10
11
 
12
DSS. 2006. Digital Signature Standard. Number FIPS 186-3. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/fips_186-3/Draft-FIPS-186-3_March2006.pdf.
 
13
 
14
 
15
HMAC. 2002. The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code. Number FIPS 198. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html.
 
16
Hu, L. and Evans, D. 2004. Using directional antennas to prevent wormhole attacks. In Proceedings of ISOC Symposium of Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS).
 
17
18
 
19
Hu, Y.-C., Perrig, A., and Johnson, D. B. 2003a. Packet leashes: A defense against wormhole attacks in wireless ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of IEEE Conference of the IEEE Communications Society (INFOCOMM).
20
21
 
22
IEEE. 1999. IEEE Std 802.11, 1999 Edition. http://standards.ieee.org/catalog/olis/lanman.html.
 
23
Jakobsson, M., Wetzel, S., and Yener, B. 2003. Stealth attacks on ad-hoc wireless networks. In IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference.
 
24
 
25
Kent, S., Lynn, C., and Seo, K. 2000. Secure border gateway protocol (s-bgp). IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communication 18, 4.
 
26
27
 
28
Lee, H. I. 2002. Afora: Ad hoc routing in the face of misbehaving nodes. Master's Thesis, MIT.
29
30
 
31
 
32
 
33
 
34
Papadimitratos, P. and Haas, Z. 2002. Secure routing for mobile ad hoc networks. In SCS Communication Networks and Distributed Systems Modeling and Simulation Conference (CNDS). 27--31.
35
36
 
37
Perkins, C. E. and Royer, E. M. 2000. Ad hoc Networking. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA. Chapter Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing.
 
38
Perlman, R. 1988. Network layer protocols with byzantine robustness. Ph.D. thesis, MIT LCS TR-429.
 
39
Perlman, R. 2005. Routing with byzantine robustness. Tech. Rep. TR-2005-146, Sun Microsystems.
 
40
Perrig, A., Canetti, R., Song, D., and Tygar, D. 2001. Efficient and secure source authentication for multicast. In Proceedings of ISOC Symposium of Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS).
41
 
42
 
43
44
 
45
46
 
47
Yoon, J., Liu, M., and Noble, B. D. 2003. Random waypoint considered harmful. In Proceedings of IEEE Conference of the IEEE Communications Society (INFOCOMM). San Francisco, CA.
 
48
Zhou, L. and Haas, Z. 1999. Securing ad hoc networks. IEEE Network Magazine 13, 6.
 
49


Collaborative Colleagues:
Baruch Awerbuch: colleagues
Reza Curtmola: colleagues
David Holmer: colleagues
Cristina Nita-Rotaru: colleagues
Herbert Rubens: colleagues