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ABSTRACT

Spam in the form of link spam and click spam has become a major obstacle in the effective functioning of ranking and reputation systems. Even in the absence of spam, difficulty in eliciting feedback and self-reinforcing nature of ranking systems are known problems. In this paper, we make a case for sharing with users the revenue generated by such systems as incentive to provide useful feedback and present an incentive based ranking scheme in a realistic model of user behavior which addresses the above problems. We give an explicit ranking algorithm based on user feedback. Our incentive structure and ranking algorithm ensure that there is a profitable arbitrage opportunity for the users of the system in correcting the inaccuracies of the ranking. The system is oblivious to the source of inaccuracies (benign or malicious), thus making it robust to spam as well as the problems of eliciting feedback and self-reinforcement.

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