ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
An empirical study of interest-based negotiation
Full text PdfPdf (812 KB)
Source
ACM International Conference Proceeding Series; Vol. 258 archive
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce table of contents
Minneapolis, MN, USA
SESSION: Session T6: mechanisms and institutions II table of contents
Pages: 339 - 348  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-700-1
Authors
Philippe Pasquier  University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
Ramon Hollands  Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands
Frank Dignum  Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands
Iyad Rahwan  British University of Dubai, Dubai, Uae
Liz Sonenberg  University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
Sponsors
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 2,   Downloads (12 Months): 51,   Citation Count: 1
Additional Information:

abstract   references   cited by   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1282100.1282163
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

While argumentation-based negotiation has been accepted as a promising alternative to game-theoretic or heuristic based negotiation, no evidence has been provided to confirm this theoretical advantage. We propose a model of bilateral negotiation extending a simple monotonic concession protocol by allowing the agents to exchange information about their underlying interests and possible alternatives to achieve them during the negotiation. We present an empirical study that demonstrates (through simulation) the advantages of this interest-based negotiation approach over the more classic monotonic concession approach to negotiation.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
H.S. Bierman and L. Fernandez. Game Theory with Economic Applications. Addison-Wesley Publishing Compagny, 2005.
 
2
3
 
4
N. R. Jennings, P. Faratin, A. R. Lomuscio, S. Parson, C. Sierra, and M. Wooldridge. Automated negotiation: Prospects, methods, and challenges. Journal of Group Decision and Negotiation, 2(10):199--215, 2001.
 
5
 
6
P. B. Linhart, R. Radner, and M. A. Satterthwaite. Bargaining with incomplete information. San Diego Academic Press, 1991.
 
7
P. Pasquier, F. Dignum, I. Rahwan, and L. Sonenberg. Interest-based negotiation as an extension of monotonic bargaining in 3APL. In Proceedings of the Ninth Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents (PRIMA 2006), volume 4088 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (LNAI), pages 569--580, Guilin, China, 2006. Springer-Verlag.
 
8
9
 
10
P. Young. Negotiation Analysis. University of Michigan Press, 1991.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Philippe Pasquier: colleagues
Ramon Hollands: colleagues
Frank Dignum: colleagues
Iyad Rahwan: colleagues
Liz Sonenberg: colleagues