Vindictive bidding in keyword auctions

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Vindictive bidding in keyword auctions

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ACM International Conference Proceeding Series; Vol. 258 archive
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce table of contents

Minneapolis, MN, USA

SESSION: Session M7: sponsored search on the internet II table of contents

Pages: 141 - 146

Year of Publication: 2007

ISBN:978-1-59593-700-1

Authors

Yunhong Zhou	HP Labs, Palo Alto, CA
Rajan Lukose	HP Labs, Palo Alto, CA

Sponsors

SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce

Publisher

ACM New York, NY, USA

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Downloads (6 Weeks): 3, Downloads (12 Months): 40, Citation Count: 1

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ABSTRACT

We study vindictive bidding, a strategic bidding behavior in keyword auctions where a bidder forces his competitor to pay more without affecting his own payment. We show that most Nash equilibria (NE) are vulnerable to vindictive bidding and are thus unstable. There always exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) if there is only one pair of vindictive players; however PSNE may not exist when there are at least three players who are all vindictive with each other. Given the set of vindictive bidding pairs, we show how to compute a PSNE if one exists. Preliminary data analysis suggests that vindictive bidding is prevalent in real-world keyword auctions. As an ongoing work, we also propose several interesting open problems related to vindictive bidding.

REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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