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Truth in advertising: lightweight verification of route integrity
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Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing archive
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing table of contents
Portland, Oregon, USA
SESSION: Security table of contents
Pages: 147 - 156  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-616-5
Authors
Edmund L. Wong  The University of Texas at Austin
Praveen Balasubramanian  The University of Texas at Austin
Lorenzo Alvisi  The University of Texas at Austin
Mohamed G. Gouda  The University of Texas at Austin
Vitaly Shmatikov  The University of Texas at Austin
Sponsors
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We design and evaluate a lightweight route verification mechanism that enables a router to discover route failures and inconsistencies between advertised Internet routes and actual paths taken by the data packets. Our mechanism is accurate, incrementally deployable, and secure against malicious intermediary routers. By carefully avoiding any cryptographic operations in the data path, our prototype implementation achieves the overhead of less than 1% on a 1 Gbps link, demonstrating that our method is suitable even for high-performance networks.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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S. Goldberg, D. Xiao, B. Barak, and J. Rexford. Measuring path quality in the presence of adversaries. http://www.princeton.edu/<goldbe/FDFL-sc.pdf, 2007.
 
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T. Wan, E. Kranakis, and P. van Oorschot. Pretty secure BGP (psBGP). In Proc. NDSS, 2005.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Edmund L. Wong: colleagues
Praveen Balasubramanian: colleagues
Lorenzo Alvisi: colleagues
Mohamed G. Gouda: colleagues
Vitaly Shmatikov: colleagues