ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Formalising arguments about the burden of persuasion
Full text PdfPdf (383 KB)
Source
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law archive
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law table of contents
Stanford, California
SESSION: Modelling legal argument table of contents
Pages: 97 - 106  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-680-6
Authors
Henry Prakken  Utrecht University, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Giovanni Sartor  University of Bologna, Florence, Italy
Sponsor
: International Association for Artificial Intelligence and Law
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 10,   Downloads (12 Months): 51,   Citation Count: 7
Additional Information:

abstract   references   cited by   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Request Permissions Request Permissions    Review this Article  
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1276318.1276338
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

This paper presents an argument-based logic for reasoning about allocations of the burden of persuasion. The logic extends the system of Prakken (2001), which in turn modified the system of Prakken & Sartor (1996) with the possibility to distribute the burden of proof over both sides in an argument game. First the (2001) system is put in the context of a distinction of three types of proof burdens and it is argued that the proof burdens of that system are in fact burdens of persuasion. Then the (2001) system is modified to allow for defeasible reasoning about allocations of such burdens within the logic. The usefulness of the resulting system is illustrated with applications to real legal cases.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
T. J. M. Bench-Capon and H. Prakken. Justifying actions by accruing arguments. In P. E. Dunne and T. J. M. Bench-Capon, editors, Computational Models of Argument. Proceedings of COMMA 2006, pages 247--258. IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2006.
 
2
 
3
T. Gordon and D. Walton. The Carneades argumentation framework - using presumptions and exceptions to model critical questions. In P. Dunne and T. Bench-Capon, editors, Computational Models of Argument. Proceedings of COMMA-06, pages 195--207, Amsterdam etc., 2006. IOS Press.
 
4
T. F. Gordon, H. Prakken, and D. N. Walton. The Carneades model of argument and burden of proof. Artificial Intelligence, 2007. To appear.
5
 
6
J. C. Hage. Comparing alternatives in the law. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 12:181--225, 2004.
7
 
8
Henry Prakken, Modelling defeasibility in law: logic or procedure?, Fundamenta Informaticae, v.48 n.2-3, p.253-271, November 2001
 
9
H. Prakken. An exercise in formalising teleological case-based reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 10:113--33, 2002.
10
 
11
H. Prakken and G. Sartor. Rules about rules: Assessing conflicting arguments in legal reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 4:331--68, 1996.
 
12
H. Prakken and G. Sartor. Presumptions and burdens of proof. In T. Van Engers, editor, Legal Knowledge and Information Systems. JURIX 2006: The Nineteenth Annual Conference, pages 21--30. IOS Press, 2006.
 
13
G. Sartor. A formal logic for legal argumentation. Ratio Juris, 7:212--26, 1994.
 
14
G. Sartor. Defeasibility in legal reasoning. In Z. Bankowski, I. White, and U. Hahn, editors, Informatics and the Foundations of Legal Reasoning, pages 119--57. Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 1995.
 
15
C. Williams. Burdens and standards in civil litigation. Sydney Law Review, 25:165--188, 2003.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Henry Prakken: colleagues
Giovanni Sartor: colleagues