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Convergence time to Nash equilibrium in load balancing
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ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG) archive
Volume 3 ,  Issue 3  (August 2007) table of contents
Article No. 32  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISSN:1549-6325
Authors
Eyal Even-Dar  University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
Alex Kesselman  Max-Planck Institut fur Informatik, Saarbrucken, Germany
Yishay Mansour  Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We study the number of steps required to reach a pure Nash equilibrium in a load balancing scenario where each job behaves selfishly and attempts to migrate to a machine which will minimize its cost. We consider a variety of load balancing models, including identical, restricted, related, and unrelated machines. Our results have a crucial dependence on the weights assigned to jobs. We consider arbitrary weights, integer weights, k distinct weights, and identical (unit) weights. We look both at an arbitrary schedule (where the only restriction is that a job migrates to a machine which lowers its cost) and specific efficient schedulers (e.g., allowing the largest weight job to move first). A by-product of our results is establishing a connection between various scheduling models and the game-theoretic notion of potential games. We show that load balancing in unrelated machines is a generalized ordinal potential game, load balancing in related machines is a weighted potential game, and load balancing in related machines and unit weight jobs is an exact potential game.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  7

Collaborative Colleagues:
Eyal Even-Dar: colleagues
Alex Kesselman: colleagues
Yishay Mansour: colleagues