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Interleaved hop-by-hop authentication against false data injection attacks in sensor networks
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ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN) archive
Volume 3 ,  Issue 3  (August 2007) table of contents
Article No. 14  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISSN:1550-4859
Authors
Sencun Zhu  The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
Sanjeev Setia  George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Sushil Jajodia  George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Peng Ning  North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Sensor networks are often deployed in unattended environments, thus leaving these networks vulnerable to false data injection attacks in which an adversary injects false data into the network with the goal of deceiving the base station or depleting the resources of the relaying nodes. Standard authentication mechanisms cannot prevent this attack if the adversary has compromised one or a small number of sensor nodes. We present three interleaved hop-by-hop authentication schemes that guarantee that the base station can detect injected false data immediately when no more than t nodes are compromised, where t is a system design parameter. Moreover, these schemes enable an intermediate forwarding node to detect and discard false data packets as early as possible. Our performance analysis shows that our scheme is efficient with respect to the security it provides, and it also allows a tradeoff between security and performance. A prototype implementation of our scheme indicates that our scheme is practical and can be deployed on the current generation of sensor nodes.


REFERENCES

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REVIEW

"Alessandro Berni : Reviewer"

Unattended sensor networks are exposed to a number of threats: the physical destruction of nodes; security attacks at the routing and data-link levels; resource consumption attacks; and insider attacks, where compromised nodes are used to inject f  more...

Collaborative Colleagues:
Sencun Zhu: colleagues
Sanjeev Setia: colleagues
Sushil Jajodia: colleagues
Peng Ning: colleagues