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Provably secure authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange
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ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) archive
Volume 10 ,  Issue 3  (July 2007) table of contents
Article No. 10  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISSN:1094-9224
Authors
Emmanuel Bresson  DCSSI Crypto Laboratory, Paris, France
Olivier Chevassut  Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, California
David Pointcheval  École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
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ABSTRACT

Authenticated key-exchange protocols allow two participants A and B, communicating over a public network and each holding an authentication means to exchange a shared secret value. Methods designed to deal with this cryptographic problem ensure A (resp. B) that no other participants aside from B (resp. A) can learn any information about the agreed value and often also ensure A and B that their respective partner has actually computed this value. A natural extension to this cryptographic method is to consider a pool of participants exchanging a shared secret value and to provide a formal treatment for it. Starting from the famous two-party Diffie--Hellman (DH) key-exchange protocol and from its authenticated variants, security experts have extended it to the multiparty setting for over a decade and, in the past few years, completed a formal analysis in the framework of modern cryptography. The present paper synthesizes this body of work on the provably-secure authenticated group DH key exchange.


REFERENCES

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Emmanuel Bresson: colleagues
Olivier Chevassut: colleagues
David Pointcheval: colleagues