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Large-scale analysis of format string vulnerabilities in Debian Linux
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Programming languages and analysis for security archive
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security table of contents
San Diego, California, USA
SESSION: Analysis against attacks table of contents
Pages: 75 - 84  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-711-7
Authors
Karl Chen  UC Berkeley
David Wagner  UC Berkeley
Sponsors
SIGPLAN: ACM Special Interest Group on Programming Languages
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Format-string bugs are a relatively common security vulnerability, and can lead to arbitrary code execution. In collaboration with others, we designed and implemented a system to eliminate format string vulnerabilities from an entire Linux distribution, using type-qualifier inference, a static analysis technique that can find taint violations.

We successfully analyze 66% of C/C++ source packages in the Debian 3.1 Linux distribution. Our system finds 1,533 format string taint warnings. We estimate that 85% of these are true positives, i.e., real bugs; ignoring duplicates from libraries, about 75% are real bugs.

We suggest that the technology exists to render format string vulnerabilities extinct in the near future.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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