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Safety and Software Intensive Systems: Challenges Old and New
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Source International Conference on Software Engineering archive
2007 Future of Software Engineering table of contents
Pages 137-152  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:0-7695-2829-5
Author
Mats P. E. Heimdahl  University of Minnesota Software Engineering Center
Publisher
IEEE Computer Society  Washington, DC, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 46,   Downloads (12 Months): 300,   Citation Count: 1
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DOI Bookmark: 10.1109/FOSE.2007.18

ABSTRACT

There is an increased use of software in safety-critical systems; a trend that is likely to continue in the future. Although traditional system safety techniques are applicable to software intensive systems, there are new challenges emerging. In this report we will address four issues we believe will pose challenges in the future. First, the nature of safety is continuing to be widely misunderstood and known system safety techniques are not applied. Second, our ability to demonstrate (certify) that safety requirements have been met is inadequate. Third, modeling and automated tools, for example, code generation and automated testing, are introduced in a hope to increase productivity; this reliance on tools rather than people, however, introduces new and poorly understood problems. Finally, safety-critical systems are increasingly relying on data (configuration data or databases), incorrect data could have catastrophic and widespread consequences.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Mats P. E. Heimdahl: colleagues