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Optimal delivery of sponsored search advertisements subject to budget constraints
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Electronic Commerce archive
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce table of contents
San Diego, California, USA
SESSION: Searching for sponsors table of contents
Pages: 272 - 278  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-653-0
Authors
Zoe Abrams  Yahoo!, Santa Clara, CA
Ofer Mendelevitch  Yahoo!, Santa Clara, CA
John Tomlin  Yahoo! Research, Santa Clara, CA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGEcom: ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We discuss an auction framework in which sponsored search advertisements are delivered in response to queries. In practice, the presence of bidder budgets can have a significant impact on the ad delivery process. We propose an approach based on linear programming which takes bidder budgets into account, and uses them in conjunction with forecasting of query frequencies, and pricing and ranking schemes, to optimize ad delivery. Simulations show significant improvements in revenue and efficiency.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Zoe Abrams: colleagues
Ofer Mendelevitch: colleagues
John Tomlin: colleagues