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ABSTRACT
We present a general construction of a zero-knowledge proof for an NP relation R(x,w) which only makes a black-box use of a secure protocol for a related multi-partyfunctionality f. The latter protocol is only required to be secure against a small number of "honest but curious" players. As an application, we can translate previous results on the efficiency of secure multiparty computation to the domain of zero-knowledge, improving over previous constructions of efficient zero-knowledge proofs. In particular, if verifying R on a witness of length m can be done by a circuit C of size s, and assuming one-way functions exist, we get the following types of zero-knowledge proof protocols. Approaching the witness length. If C has constant depth over ∧,∨,⊕, - gates of unbounded fan-in, we get a zero-knowledge protocol with communication complexity m·poly(k)·polylog(s), where k is a security parameter. Such a protocol can be implemented in either the standard interactive model or, following a trusted setup, in a non-interactive model. "Constant-rate" zero-knowledge. For an arbitrary circuit C of size s and a bounded fan-in, we geta zero-knowledge protocol with communication complexity O(s)+poly(k). Thus, for large circuits, the ratio between the communication complexity and the circuit size approaches a constant. This improves over the O(ks) complexity of the best previous protocols.
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CITED BY 3
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Yuval Ishai , Eyal Kushilevitz , Rafail Ostrovsky , Amit Sahai, Cryptography with constant computational overhead, Proceedings of the 40th annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, May 17-20, 2008, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada
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