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Universally composable and forward-secure RFID authentication and authenticated key exchange
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Source ASIAN ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Singapore
SESSION: RFID & watermarking table of contents
Pages: 242 - 252  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:1-59593-574-6
Authors
Tri Van Le  Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL
Mike Burmester  Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL
Breno de Medeiros  Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 30,   Downloads (12 Months): 202,   Citation Count: 9
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ABSTRACT

Recently, a universally composable framework for RFID authentication protocols providing availability, anonymity, and authenticity was proposed. In this paper we extend that framework to address forward-security issues in the presence of key compromise.We also introduce new, provably secure, and highly practical protocols for anonymous authentication and key-exchange by RFID devices. The new protocols are lightweight, requiring only a pseudo-random bit generator. The new protocols satisfy forward-secure anonymity, authenticity, and availability requirements in the Universal Composability model.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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CITED BY  9

Collaborative Colleagues:
Tri Van Le: colleagues
Mike Burmester: colleagues
Breno de Medeiros: colleagues