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Detecting relay attacks with timing-based protocols
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Source ASIAN ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Singapore
SESSION: Applications & security policy table of contents
Pages: 204 - 213  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:1-59593-574-6
Authors
Jason Reid  Queensland University of Technology, Australia
Juan M. Gonzalez Nieto  Queensland University of Technology, Australia
Tee Tang  Queensland University of Technology, Australia
Bouchra Senadji  Queensland University of Technology, Australia
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Distance-bounding protocols have been proposed as a means of detecting relay attacks, also known as mafia fraud. In this paper we present the first symmetric key based distance-bounding protocol that is also resistant to so-called terrorist fraud, a variant of mafia fraud. Distance-bounding protocols require a communication channel that can exchange single bits with extremely low latency. This unconventional communication requirement has prompted Hancke and Kuhn to assert in a recent publication that ultra wide band (UWB) radio is necessary to achieve a useful distance-bounding resolution for RF security devices (contactless smart cards, RFID tags and the like). We analyse this assertion and present an alternative, novel communication approach that leverages the phenomena of side channel leakage to deliver a low latency channel. Our proposal is capable of detecting sophisticated relay attacks without resorting to the considerable expense and complexity of UWB radio. We present experimental results to support our arguments.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Jason Reid: colleagues
Juan M. Gonzalez Nieto: colleagues
Tee Tang: colleagues
Bouchra Senadji: colleagues