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Concurrently-secure credential ownership proofs
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Source ASIAN ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Singapore
SESSION: Authentication & trust management table of contents
Pages: 161 - 172  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:1-59593-574-6
Authors
Siamak Shahandashti  University of Wollongong, Australia
Reihaneh Safavi-Naini  University of Wollongong, Australia
Joonsang Baek  Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R), Singapore
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We address the case in credential systems where a credential owner wants to show her credential to a verifier without taking the risk that the ability to prove ownership of the same (and any other) credential is transferred to the verifier. We define credential ownership proof protocols for credentials signed by standard signature schemes. We also propose proper security definitions for the protocol, aiming to protect the security of both the credential issuer and the credential owner against concurrent attacks. We give two generic constructions of credential ownership proofs based on identity-based encryption and identity-based identification schemes. Furthermore, we show that signatures with credential ownership proofs are equivalent to identity-based identification schemes, in the sense that any secure construction of each implies a secure construction of the other. Finally, we show that the GQ identification protocol yields an efficient credential ownership proof for credentials signed by the RSA-FDH signature scheme of Bellare and Rogaway and prove the protocol concurrently-secure.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Siamak Shahandashti: colleagues
Reihaneh Safavi-Naini: colleagues
Joonsang Baek: colleagues