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Private stateful circuits secure against probing attacks
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Source ASIAN ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Singapore
SESSION: Anonymity systems & formal method table of contents
Pages: 63 - 69  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:1-59593-574-6
Authors
Yu Yu  T-Systems Singapore Pte Ltd, Temasek Tower, Singapore
Jussipekka Leiwo  T-Systems Singapore Pte Ltd, Temasek Tower, Singapore
Benjamin Premkumar  Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We discuss the following problem: how to guarantee privacy of a circuit if an adversary can eavesdrop on its wires, where the functionality of the circuit is assumed public and the adversary attempts to discover information regarding the computation, namely, input, intermediate results and output. We present a solution by introducing a private stateful circuit that securely (against probing attacks) computes the same function as the original circuit does. This is achieved with a reasonable increase in circuit size and depth.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Yu Yu: colleagues
Jussipekka Leiwo: colleagues
Benjamin Premkumar: colleagues