Private stateful circuits secure against probing attacks

ABSTRACT

We discuss the following problem: how to guarantee privacy of a circuit if an adversary can eavesdrop on its wires, where the functionality of the circuit is assumed public and the adversary attempts to discover information regarding the computation, namely, input, intermediate results and output. We present a solution by introducing a private stateful circuit that securely (against probing attacks) computes the same function as the original circuit does. This is achieved with a reasonable increase in circuit size and depth.

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  C. Computer Systems Organization
  C.2 COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
      C.2.0 General
          Subjects: Security and protection (e.g., firewalls)

Keywords:
secure hardware implementation