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Kleptographic attacks on a cascade of mix servers
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Source ASIAN ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Singapore
SESSION: Anonymity systems & formal method table of contents
Pages: 57 - 62  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:1-59593-574-6
Authors
Przemysław Kubiak  Wroclaw University of Technology
Mirosław Kutyłowski  Wroclaw University of Technology
Filip Zagórski  Wroclaw University of Technology
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

A cascade of mix servers is a crucial part of e-voting protocols and other schemes which aim for user's anonymity. We present kleptographic attacks on such cascades. In order to show interesting consequences, we focus on a cascade used as a building block of a Prêt à Voter e-voting protocol. However, the attacks might be generalized to any cascade of probabilistic mix servers.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Przemysław Kubiak: colleagues
Mirosław Kutyłowski: colleagues
Filip Zagórski: colleagues