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A k-anonymous communication protocol for overlay networks
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Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Singapore
SESSION: Anonymity systems & formal method table of contents
Pages: 45 - 56  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:1-59593-574-6
Authors
Pan Wang  NC State University, Raleigh, NC
Peng Ning  NC State University, Raleigh, NC
Douglas S. Reeves  NC State University, Raleigh, NC
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Anonymity is increasingly important for network applications concerning about censorship and privacy. The existing anonymous communication protocols generally stem from mixnet and DC-net. They either cannot provide provable anonymity or suffer from transmission collision. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach which takes advantage of hierarchical ring structure and mix technique. This proposed protocol is collision free and provides provable k-anonymity for both the sender and the recipient, even if a polynomial time adversary can eavesdrop all network traffic and control a fraction of participants. Furthermore, it can hide the sender and the recipient from each other and thus can be used for anonymous file sharing. The analysis shows the proposed protocol is secure against various attacks. Measurements further demonstrate it is practical.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Pan Wang: colleagues
Peng Ning: colleagues
Douglas S. Reeves: colleagues