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Analyzing network traffic to detect self-decrypting exploit code
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Source ASIAN ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Singapore
SESSION: Network security table of contents
Pages: 4 - 12  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:1-59593-574-6
Authors
Qinghua Zhang  North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC
Douglas S. Reeves  North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC
Peng Ning  North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC
S. Purushothaman Iyer  North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Remotely-launched software exploits are a common way for attackers to intrude into vulnerable computer systems. As detection techniques improve, remote exploitation techniques are also evolving. Recent techniques for evasion of exploit detection include polymorphism (code encryption) and meta-morphism (code obfuscation). This paper addresses the problem of detecting in network traffic polymorphic remote exploits that are encrypted, and that self-decrypt before launching the intrusion. Such exploits pose a great challenge to existing malware detection techniques, partly due to the non-obvious starting location of the exploit code in the network payload.We describe a new method for detecting self-decrypting exploit codes. This method scans network traffic for the presence of a decryption routine, which is characteristic of such exploits. The proposed method uses static analysis and emulated instruction execution techniques. This improves the accuracy of determining the starting location and instructions of the decryption routine, even if self-modifying code is used. The method outperforms approaches that have been previously proposed, both in terms of detection capabilities, and in detection accuracy.The proposed method has been implemented and tested on current polymorphic exploits, including ones generated by state-of-the-art polymorphic engines. All exploits have been detected (i.e., a 100% detection rate), including those for which the decryption routine is dynamically coded, or self-modifying. The false positive rate is close to 0%. Running time is approximately linear in the size of the network payload being analyzed.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Qinghua Zhang: colleagues
Douglas S. Reeves: colleagues
Peng Ning: colleagues
S. Purushothaman Iyer: colleagues