On the evolution of adversary models in security protocols: from the beginning to sensor networks

ABSTRACT

Invariably, new technologies introduce new vulnerabilities which often enable new attacks by increasingly potent adversaries. Yet new systems are more adept at handling well-known attacks by old adversaries than anticipating new ones. Our adversary models seem to be perpetually out of date: often they do not capture adversary attacks and sometimes they address attacks rendered impractical by new technologies.In this talk, I provide a brief overview of adversary models beginning with those required by program and data sharing technologies ('60-'70s), continuing with those required by computer communication and networking technologies ('70s-'90s), and ending with those required by and sensor network technologies ('00s ->). I argue that sensor, ad-hoc, and mesh networks require new models, different from those in common use, namely those of the Dolev-Yao and Byzantine adversaries. I illustrate this with adversaries that attack perfectly sensible and otherwise correct protocols of sensor networks. These attacks cannot be countered with traditional security protocols using end-to-end design arguments and require emergent security properties as countermeasures.

INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  K. Computing Milieux
  K.6 MANAGEMENT OF COMPUTING AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
      K.6.5 Security and Protection (D.4.6, K.4.2)

Additional Classification:
  C. Computer Systems Organization
  C.2 COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
      C.2.0 General
          Subjects: Security and protection (e.g., firewalls)
  C.3 SPECIAL-PURPOSE AND APPLICATION-BASED SYSTEMS
      Subjects: Signal processing systems

  E. Data
  E.3 DATA ENCRYPTION
  E.4 CODING AND INFORMATION THEORY

General Terms:
Algorithms, Security