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A semantics-based approach to malware detection
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Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages table of contents
Nice, France
SESSION: Session 13 table of contents
Pages: 377 - 388  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:1-59593-575-4
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Authors
Mila Dalla Preda  University of Verona, Verona, Italy
Mihai Christodorescu  University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI
Somesh Jha  University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI
Saumya Debray  University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ
Sponsors
SIGPLAN: ACM Special Interest Group on Programming Languages
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Malware detection is a crucial aspect of software security. Current malware detectors work by checking for "signatures," which attempt to capture (syntactic) characteristics of the machine-level byte sequence of the malware. This reliance on a syntactic approach makes such detectors vulnerable to code obfuscations, increasingly used by malware writers, that alter syntactic properties of the malware byte sequence without significantly affecting their execution behavior.This paper takes the position that the key to malware identification lies in their semantics. It proposes a semantics-based framework for reasoning about malware detectors and proving properties such as soundness and completeness of these detectors. Our approach uses a trace semantics to characterize the behaviors of malware as well as the program being checked for infection, and uses abstract interpretation to "hide" irrelevant aspects of these behaviors. As a concrete application of our approach, we show that the semantics-aware malware detector proposed by Christodorescu et al. is complete with respect to a number of common obfuscations used by malware writers.


REFERENCES

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Mila Dalla Preda: colleagues
Mihai Christodorescu: colleagues
Somesh Jha: colleagues
Saumya Debray: colleagues