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Achieving cooperation in multihop wireless networks of selfish nodes
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Source ACM International Conference Proceeding Series; Vol. 199 archive
Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks table of contents
Pisa, Italy
SESSION: Wireless networks table of contents
Article No. 3  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-507-X
Authors
Fabio Milan  Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy
Juan José Jaramillo  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
R. Srikant  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
: Create-Net
ICST : International Communication Sciences and Technology Association
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

In a multihop wireless network, routing a packet from source to destination requires cooperation among nodes. If nodes are selfish, reputation-based mechanisms can be used to sustain cooperation without resorting to a central authority. Within a hop-by-hop reputation-based mechanism, every node listens to its relaying neighbors, and the misbehaving ones are punished by dropping a fraction of their packets, according to a Tit-for-tat strategy. Packet collisions may prevent a node from recognizing a correct transmission, distorting the evaluated reputation. Therefore, even if all the nodes are willing to cooperate, the retaliation triggered by a perceived defection may eventually lead to zero throughput. A classical solution to this problem is to add a tolerance threshold to the pure Tit-for-tat strategy, so that a limited number of defections will not be punished. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model to study the impact of collisions on a hop-by-hop reputation-based mechanism for regular networks with uniform random traffic. Our results show that the Nash Equilibrium of a Generous Tit-for-tat strategy is cooperative for any admissible load, if the nodes are sufficiently far-sighted, or equivalently if the value for a packet to the nodes is sufficiently high with respect to the transmission cost. We also study two more severe punishment schemes, namely One-step Trigger and Grim Trigger, that can achieve cooperation under milder conditions.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  8

Collaborative Colleagues:
Fabio Milan: colleagues
Juan José Jaramillo: colleagues
R. Srikant: colleagues