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ABSTRACT
“Experts algorithms” constitute a methodology for choosing actions repeatedly, when the rewards depend both on the choice of action and on the unknown current state of the environment. An experts algorithm has access to a set of strategies (“experts”), each of which may recommend which action to choose. The algorithm learns how to combine the recommendations of individual experts so that, in the long run, for any fixed sequence of states of the environment, it does as well as the best expert would have done relative to the same sequence. This methodology may not be suitable for situations where the evolution of states of the environment depends on past chosen actions, as is usually the case, for example, in a repeated non-zero-sum game.A general exploration-exploitation experts method is presented along with a proper definition of value. The definition is shown to be adequate in that it both captures the impact of an expert's actions on the environment and is learnable. The new experts method is quite different from previously proposed experts algorithms. It represents a shift from the paradigms of regret minimization and myopic optimization to consideration of the long-term effect of a player's actions on the environment. The importance of this shift is demonstrated by the fact that this algorithm is capable of inducing cooperation in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, whereas previous experts algorithms converge to the suboptimal non-cooperative play. The method is shown to asymptotically perform as well as the best available expert. Several variants are analyzed from the viewpoint of the exploration-exploitation tradeoff, including explore-then-exploit, polynomially vanishing exploration, constant-frequency exploration, and constant-size exploration phases. Complexity and performance bounds are proven.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi , Yoav Freund , David Haussler , David P. Helmbold , Robert E. Schapire , Manfred K. Warmuth, How to use expert advice, Journal of the ACM (JACM), v.44 n.3, p.427-485, May 1997
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