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Deniable authentication and key exchange
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Applied cryptography II table of contents
Pages: 400 - 409  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-518-5
Authors
Mario Di Raimondo  Università di Catania, Italy
Rosario Gennaro  IBM T.J.Watson Research Center
Hugo Krawczyk  IBM T.J.Watson Research Center
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
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ABSTRACT

We extend the definitional work of Dwork,Naor and Sahai from deniable authentication to deniable key-exchange protocols. We then use these definitions to prove the deniability features of SKEME and SIGMA, two natural and efficient protocols which serve as basis for the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)protocol.SKEME is an encryption-based protocol for which we prove full deniability based on the plaintext awareness of the underlying encryption scheme. Interestingly SKEME's deniability is possibly the first "natural" application which essentially requires plaintext awareness (until now this notion has been mainly used as a tool for proving chosen-ciphertext security).SIGMA, on the other hand,uses non-repudiable signatures for authentication and hence cannot be proven to be fully deniable. Yet we are able to prove a weaker, but meaningful, "partial deniability" property: a party may not be able to deny that it was "alive" at some point in time but can fully deny the contents of its communications and the identity of its interlocutors.We remark that the deniability of SKEME and SIGMA holds in a concurrent setting and does not essentially rely on the random oracle model.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Mario Di Raimondo: colleagues
Rosario Gennaro: colleagues
Hugo Krawczyk: colleagues