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Dictionary attacks using keyboard acoustic emanations
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Attacks and cryptanalysis table of contents
Pages: 245 - 254  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-518-5
Authors
Yigael Berger  Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Israel
Avishai Wool  Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Israel
Arie Yeredor  Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Israel
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We present a dictionary attack that is based on keyboard acoustic emanations. We combine signal processing and efficient data structures and algorithms, to successfully reconstruct single words of 7-13 characters from a recording of the clicks made when typing them on a keyboard. Our attack does not require any training, and works on an individual recording of the typed word (may be under 5 seconds of sound). The attack is very efficient, taking under 20 seconds per word on a standard PC. We demonstrate a 90% or better success rate of finding the correct word in the top 50 candidates identified by the attack, for words of 10 or more characters, and a success rate of 73% over all the words we tested. We show that the dominant factors affecting the attack's success are the word length, and more importantly, the number of repeated characters within the word. Our attack can be used as an effective acoustic-based password cracker. Our attack can also be used as part of an acoustic long-text reconstruction method, that is much more efficient and requires much less text than previous approaches.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Yigael Berger: colleagues
Avishai Wool: colleagues
Arie Yeredor: colleagues