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How to win the clonewars: efficient periodic n-times anonymous authentication
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Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Applied cryptography I table of contents
Pages: 201 - 210  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-518-5
Authors
Jan Camenisch  IBM Research
Susan Hohenberger  IBM Research
Markulf Kohlweiss  Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Anna Lysyanskaya  Brown University
Mira Meyerovich  Brown University
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
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ABSTRACT

We create a credential system that lets a user anonymously authenticate at most $n$ times in a single time period. A user withdraws a dispenser of n e-tokens. She shows an e-token to a verifier to authenticate herself; each e-token can be used only once, however, the dispenser automatically refreshes every time period. The only prior solution to this problem, due to Damgård et al. [29], uses protocols that are a factor of k slower for the user and verifier, where k is the security parameter. Damgård et al. also only support one authentication per time period, while we support n. Because our construction is based on e-cash, we can use existing techniques to identify a cheating user, trace all of her e-tokens, and revoke her dispensers. We also offer a new anonymity service: glitch protection for basically honest users who (occasionally) reuse e-tokens. The verifier can always recognize a reused e-token; however, we preserve the anonymity of users who do not reuse e-tokens too often.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  8

Collaborative Colleagues:
Jan Camenisch: colleagues
Susan Hohenberger: colleagues
Markulf Kohlweiss: colleagues
Anna Lysyanskaya: colleagues
Mira Meyerovich: colleagues