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On the modeling and analysis of obligations
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Access control table of contents
Pages: 134 - 143  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-518-5
Authors
Keith Irwin  North Carolina State University
Ting Yu  North Carolina State University
William H. Winsborough  University of Texas at San Antonio
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 2,   Downloads (12 Months): 81,   Citation Count: 6
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ABSTRACT

Traditional security policies largely focus on access control requirements, which specify who can access what under what circumstances. Besides access control requirements, the availability of services in many applications often further imposes obligation requirements, which specify what actions have to be taken by a subject in the future as a condition of getting certain privileges at present. However, it is not clear yet what the implications of obligation policies are concerning the security goals of a system.In this paper, we propose a formal metamodel that captures the key aspects of a system that are relevant to obligation management. We formally investigate the interpretation of security policies from the perspective of obligations, and define secure system states based on the concept of accountability. We also study the complexity of checking a state's accountability under different assumptions about a system.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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K. Irwin, T. Yu, and W. Winsborough. On the modeling and analysis of obligations. Technical Report NCSU CS TR 2006-26, North Carolina State University, 2006. ftp://ftp.ncsu.edu/pub/unity/lockers/ftp/csc_anon/tech/2006/TR-2006-26.%.pdf.
 
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CITED BY  6

Collaborative Colleagues:
Keith Irwin: colleagues
Ting Yu: colleagues
William H. Winsborough: colleagues