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Modelling the relative strength of security protocols
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Quality of protection table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Network security metrics table of contents
Pages: 45 - 48  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-553-3
Authors
Ho Chung  University of Southern California, Los Angeles
Clifford Neuman  University of Southern California, Los Angeles
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 5,   Downloads (12 Months): 42,   Citation Count: 1
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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we present a way to think about the relative strength of security protocols using SoS, a lattice-theoretic representation of security strength. In particular, we discuss how the model can be used, present the TLS protocol as a compelling real world example, show how it is modeled, and then explain how lattice-theoretic properties can be used to evaluate security protocols.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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H. Chung and C. Neuman. Modelling the relative strength of security protocols. Technical Report 06-882, University of Southern California, Computer Science Department, August 2006.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Ho Chung: colleagues
Clifford Neuman: colleagues