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ABSTRACT
We present an anti-pirate revocation scheme for broadcast encryption systems (e.g., pay TV), in which the data is encrypted to ensure payment by users. In the systems we consider, decryption of keys is done on smartcards and key management is done in-band. Our starting point is a scheme of Naor and Pinkas. Their basic scheme uses secret sharing to remove up to t parties, is information-theoretic secure against coalitions of size t, and is capable of creating a new group key. However, with current smartcard technology, this scheme is only feasible for small system parameters, allowing up to about 100 pirates to be revoked before all the smartcards need to be replaced. We first present a novel implementation method of their basic scheme that distributes the work among the smartcard, set-top terminal, and center. Based on this, we construct several improved schemes for many revocation rounds that scale to realistic system sizes. We allow up to about 10,000 pirates to be revoked using current smartcard technology before recarding is needed. The transmission lengths of our constructions are on par with those of the best tree-based schemes. However, our constructions have much lower smartcard CPU complexity: only O(1) smartcard operations per revocation round (a single 10-byte field multiplication and addition), as opposed to the complexity of the best tree-based schemes, which is polylogarithmic in the number of users. We evaluate the system behavior via an exhaustive simulation study coupled with a queueing theory analysis. Our simulations show that with mild assumptions on the piracy discovery rate, our constructions can perform effective pirate revocation for realistic broadcast encryption scenarios.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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